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The most perplexing international issues are those not critical 
enough to threaten vital national interests but still important enough 
to shape the future While often subordinated to more pressing or 
glamorous concerns they eventually return to haunt policy makers 
For America Pakistan and its larger South Asian neighbor India have 
historically fallen into such a policy black hole Both were far enough 
away from European and East Asian points of confrontation with the 
Soviet Union to make them marginal players in the strategy of 
containment Nor was South Asia itself a major prize Lacking 
significant natural resources an advanced indústrial structure or a 
critical geostrategic position (compared say with that of Iran) it took 
special circumstances between 1965 and 1979 for the region to claim 
American attention It often did so with a vengeance as in the 1971 
tilt to Pakistan or the shock of the late 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in these and other instances years of neglect found 
Washington uninformed and unprepared to deal with significant 
regional crises
For better or worse those days are behind us While neither 
India nor Pakistan threatens (or could significantly advance) vital 
American interests they now command sustained American attention
because of their role in the U S Soviet-PRC competition because of 
unprecedented regional developments (including but not confined to 
nuclear proliferation) and because they are likely to play an enhanced 
economic military and political role in the Persian Gulf the Indian 
Ocean and beyond (Pakistan for example is Iran s leading trading 
partner and one of the major suppliers of heroin to the U S market 
while India has become a leàding exporter of computer software to 
Europe and North America)
South Asia is evolving into an historically significant regional 
system with India and Pakistan on the edge of a military nuclear 
capability with China and the Soviet Union on their borders and with 
the United States as a de facto participant in regional affairs we are 
witnessing the evolution of a five-sided security system All of the 
members of this pentagonal system are either nuclear or near nuclear 
states none are in close alignment and each is in varying degree 
suspicious of the other Such a system is historically unprecedented 
the closest parallel being the 19th Century European balance of power
America's Dilemmas in South Asia
Six years of sustained attention to Pakistan and its neighbors 
have brought about a degree of maturation in America s understanding 
of South Asia 1 Yet the dilemmas remain that faced the U S in its 
initial response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979
• Washington s military and economic assistance 
relationship with Pakistan serves the interests of both 
countries yet while they often overlap these interests are 
not identical
• The most significant point of divergence is Pakistan s 
evident pursuit of a military nuclear program But 
terminating the U S relationship would certainly speed 
up rather than retard Pakistan s effort to join the nuclear 
club and could endanger support for the Mujahiddin 
freedom fighters
• In seeking to contain Soviet power by building up Pakistan 
the U S necessarily strengthens Pakistan against India the 
region s dominant power and the state which Islamabad 
identifies as its chief threat
1 For an authoritative statement see the address of Michael Armacost Under 
Secretary of State South Asia and the United States An Evolving Partnership before The 
Asia Society Washington D C April 29 1987
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• India not only has the capacity to undercut U S support for 
Pakistan by putting political and military pressure on 
Islamabad it has the option of defeating the purpose of 
such support by enhancing its own cooperation with the 
Soviet Union
American policies on all of these issues are largely but not 
entirely shaped by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan Although there 
has been an effort to develop a regional South Asian policy even that is 
conceived in anti-Soviet terms This approach has sufficed for the 
past six years since there was little likelihood of the Soviet s pulling 
out of Kabul However the successes of the Mujahiddin the failure of 
the Soviets to impose either a political or a military settlement on the 
Afghan people and the continuing pressure on Moscow from virtually 
the entire free world have given rise to a new round of speculation 
that the Soviets may be seriously reconsidering their Afghan 
adventure
If this is the case and I am optimistic that it is then the U S 
needs a coherent post-Afghanistan policy for South Asia-while 
guarding against an mcrease m Soviet forces and an increase m Soviet 
pressure on Pakistan Indeed a narrowly drawn policy that only deals 
with the Soviet threat will fail in regional terms which means that it 
will fail completely Both Indian and Pakistani leaders are concerned 
about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and possible further Soviet 
advances into South and Southwest Asia but they remam obsessed 
with their own relationship and other regional issues
America is thus faced with two sets of policy issues in South Asia 
The first involves establishing a relationship with Pakistan that keeps 
the pressure on the Soviets without conceding to Pakistan a carte 
blanche on other issues The second set has to do with the 
development of a regional arrangement that will stabilize South Asia 
after the Soviets depart While the first issue cluster is of obvious and 
immediate importance it is not too soon to consider the second set 
Indeed the evolution of a stable and secure South Asia is a 
necessary- although not sufficient- condition to nd the region of its 
Soviet presence
The U S and South Asia A Part-Time Player?
From 1947 onward U S policy in South Asia has been chiefly 
influenced by the strategy of containment This strategy was applied 
to South Asia late in that year when American officials had to respond 
to requests for weapons from both India and Pakistan They 
concluded that the objective of U S regional policy should be to 
prevent Soviet encroachment or domination prevent Soviet access 
to the region and encourage cooperation between regional countries
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There was also the expectation that America and its Western allies 
might be granted the use of areas or facilities which might be 
required for operations against the U S S R  in the event of war 
Finally American policymakers were aware of the dangers of alienating 
either India or Pakistan should the U S develop a too-close 
relationship with the other 2
This strategy was unevenly implemented over the years After an 
initial attempt to avoid regional engagement entirely— in the hope that 
India and Pakistan would submerge their differences and act together 
to preserve the regional security system built up by the British—the 
U S entered into a major arms relationship with Pakistan in 1954 
Simultaneously it made major economic grants to India funding both 
sides of a regional arms race but also in effect strengthening both 
sides against outside powers
American policy unravelled not because the U S was trying to 
support two hostile neighbors but because these states did not share 
America s threat perceptions India was willing to accept substantial 
U S military assistance after its 1962 war with China but never 
regarded the Soviet Union as a regional problem Pakistan while 
strongly proclaiming that such a Soviet threat existed sought political 
and military ties (m the face of stiff American opposition) to Beijing in 
the mid-60s and deployed virtually all of its U S -supplied equipment 
against India
By 1965 containment of Soviet influence ceased to be a major 
factor in U S policy towards South Asia The U S went so far as to 
support the Soviet peacekeeping effort after the 1965 Indo Pakistan 
war and virtually ended its military relationship with both regional 
states Except for the tilt to Pakistan during the 1971 Indo Pak war 
and a strenuous effort to stop the Indian and Pakistani nuclear 
programs during the Carter administration South Asia ceased to exist 
for Washington Ironically these two interventions proved devastating 
for American policy The tilt angered the Indians and utterly 
disillusioned the Pakistanis (who still believe they were betrayed by 
the U S ) Carter s crude attempt to stop proliferation may have 
actually stimulated regional nuclear ambition^ and led Indians and 
Pakistanis alike to conclude that the U S was an unreliable and fickle 
superpower with little interest in this area
The U S and Pakistan a Limited Partnership
Two events resurrected American interest in South Asia 
particularly in Pakistan The most significant of course was the
2 See U S Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, Voi 3. 1947 
(Washington D C 1972)
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan However the earlier fall of the Shah 
signalled the vulnerability of America s regional position Throughout 
the fifties and much of the sixties Pakistan had been regarded as the 
stable pro-western power and Iran an important but lesser state 
Pakistanis were chagrined by Carter s cultivation of the Shah 
especially when contrasted with his derision of Pakistan s admittedly 
shaky human rights record and his attempts to stop Islamabad s bomb 
project
These concerns were quickly put aside after the Soviet invasion 
The Carter administration offered Islamabad a one-year renewable 
arms assistance package which was promptly rejected as peanuts by 
President Zia The Pakistanis had warned of the buildup of Soviet 
influence m Afghanistan after the 1978 coup and were not impressed 
with Carter s strategic judgement They coolly waited out the U S 
election and were rewarded with an unprecedented six-year arms and 
assistance package A few advanced systems were included in that 
package (chiefly F-16s and Harpoon SSMs) but most of it was devoted 
to the limited modernization of Pakistan s obsolete Chinese-supplied 
military establishment Importantly the package was intended not 
only to strengthen Pakistan against Soviet pressure but also to 
enhance its overall security position (implying the India threat) so that 
it would not have to go down the nuclear road
This assistance program has been a success The weapons 
provided to Islamabad are tangible evidence of America s renewed 
interest m the containment of Soviet power Pakistan which remains 
the temporary homeland for nearly three million Afghan refugees 
would not have been able to stand up to Soviet pressure without U S 
help there was strong sentiment even in the Pakistan Army to 
concede Afghanistan to the Soviets rather than take them on 
unassisted Instead with Western Chinese and strong Middle 
Eastern support Pakistan has backed a number of Mujahiddin groups 
these have put effective pressure on the Soviets and the puppet Afghan 
regime But Pakistan has with U S encouragement also pursued a 
diplomatic strategy designed get the Soviets out of Afghanistan without 
embarrassment This carrot and stick approach is working and it is 
only a matter of time before the Soviets wind down their war 3
Even this unprecedented U S assistance package has not eased 
Pakistani concerns about U S policy Pakistan which is now a 
member of the Non-Aligned Movement does not want to be seen 
solely as an instrument of American containment policy The 
difference between the two countries on this issue is epitomized by
The U S Pakistan relationship has also enhanced American influence on such non 
strategic issues as the democratization of Pakistani politics and the control of narcotics and 
terrorism similarly the expanded U S India dialogue prompted by strategic concerns has 
also led to close cooperation on narcotics and terrorism Issues
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the Pakistani refusal to identify themselves as a frontline state even 
though the term is freely applied by American officials
While cooperating with the U S on Afghanistan Pakistanis are 
hedging their bets for four reasons First the Pakistani leadership 
remains unsure about continuity in U S policy especially after the 
1988 elections Pakistanis still regard China as their most reliable 
friend and have doubts about U S constancy once the Afghan issue is 
settled Second Pakistan intends to pursue its nuclear program and 
the U S shows no sign of accepting Pakistan as a nuclear power 
Third Pakistan has been unable to obtain security guarantees from the 
U S that would apply against India which remains Pakistan s chief 
military threat
Finally Pakistan is unsure about the harmony of interests 
between Washington and Islamabad in the Gulf and Middle East 
Pakistan sees itself as an independent force in the Gulf and has 
managed to retain good ties to both Iran and the conservative Gulf 
Arab states Pakistani officials are astonished at inconsistencies in U S 
Gulf policy and suspicious of the influence of Israel While recognizing 
a fundamental harmony of interest m the Gulf they are wary of open 
cooperation with an unpredictable and unreliable America This is 
partly the result of twenty years of neglectful and erratic U S policy 
but Americas image m Pakistan has not been helped by nearly forty 
years of extremist anti-U S propaganda emanating from PLO Arab 
League Soviet and more recently revolutionary Iranian sources
The current assistance package coupled with regular high level 
talks on Afghan-related issues and regional policies meets immediate 
U S and Pakistani interests That package and these discussions have 
enabled the two countries to coordinate their Afghan policies and 
explore common interests in Southwest Asia and the Gulf There is 
still no strategic cooperation between the U S and Pakistan in the 
Gulf but there is sufficient understanding of how to react to any sharp 
increase in Soviet pressure against Pakistan In time there may yet 
emerge a degree of coordination of policies in the Gulf between the 
Islamabad and Washington which might in turn lead to actual 
cooperation Here the chief obstacle is American not Pakistani 
inconsistency
The assistance package should be renewed It is a vital 
component of the U S -Pakistan relationship a relationship which 
serves both countries well Although there are legitimate questions 
concerning particular systems (especially as these might affect India) 
the more difficult problem is the linkage of the program to Pakistan s 
nuclear program
The Carter administration was unable to stop this program by 
threats and by cutting off a very modest aid program The Reagan
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administration bought time by strengthening Pakistan s conventional 
forces this deferred but has not terminated Pakistan s nuclear 
ambitions
The tension between Pakistani nuclear ambitions and U S non 
proliferation objectives was brought to a new peak by a series of 
revelations in mid-Summer 1987 4 These efforts contradict explicit 
Pakistani pledges that the U S would not be embarrassed by 
Islamabad s nuclear program They also threaten to activate the 
Solarz Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act This requires a cut 
off of U S assistance to any country which illegally procures nuclear- 
related material in the United States U S law allows for a waiver of 
this provision if the President determines that the termination of 
such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
common defense and security but this would only temporarily defer a 
showdown between Congress and the executive and the U S and 
Pakistan 5
However Pakistan would not think of giving up its program 
without ironclad guarantees against India or unless India itself gives up 
its own nuclear program Neither condition is likely Indeed there is 
ample evidence that Pakistan has for years seen its nuclear program as 
part of a broader westward looking strategy Popular Pakistani opinion 
looks towards the Indian border but most of the Pakistani leadership 
sees the Indian threat as the lever by which it can obtain nuclear and 
conventional systems which will enable Pakistan to assume a major 
strategic role in the Gulf and West Asia
The assistance package still gives the U S some leverage over 
Islamabads nuclear program This might yet be capped without 
endangering current U S -Pakistan cooperation on Afghanistan and 
future cooperation in the Gulf and Southwest Asia Highly restrictive 
Congressional proposals to terminate aid to Pakistan are simply not 
credible (Pakistan would certainly exercise its option should the U S 
apply heavy pressure to terminate the nuclear program ) But the 
increasing degree of ambiguity that will accompany further Pakistani 
nuclear developments is also not tolerable Islamabad s program 
threatens to provoke a South Asian nuclear arms race it will activate 
Israeli nuclear concerns and it could undermine the entire non
New York Times July 16 and 18 1987 carry stories of two covert Pakistani 
purchasing operations in the United States one for the purchase of special steels used in the 
construction of a uranium enrichment facility the other for the illegal purchase of special test 
instruments Other Pakistani purchasing activities in Europe have also come to light
5 Public Law 99 83 August 1985 Section 1204 amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961
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proliferation regime However imperfect the importance of this 
regime is newly underscored by U S Soviet talks over deep cuts in 
nuclear systems
One way out of this nuclear policy dilemma is to establish short 
term positive incentives for Pakistan to suspend its nuclear program 
Without cutting the size of the assistance package the sale of specific 
weapons and the balance between military and economic 
assistance could be linked to specific Pakistani restraints Since a 
major justification for the arms program was to reduce Pakistani 
incentives to go nuclear such a linkage is in conformity with 
established U S policy it would in effect test the intensity of 
Pakistan s nuclear ambitions It may be that nothing will temper these 
ambitions on the other hand offering positive inducements for 
Pakistani restraint (coupled with an effort to establish a regional 
nuclear agreement to be discussed below) could have a fair chance of 
success
Failing this it is important to prepare now for the emergence of 
Pakistan as a regional nuclear power A nuclear capability will 
strengthen Pakistan s position as a mediator m the Iran Iraq war it 
may increase Islamabad s leverage with the Soviets on the terms of an 
Afghanistan settlement and it would certainly enhance Pakistan s 
prestige in the Islamic and non-aligned movements These 
developments are not necessarily harmful to American interests But 
given Pakistans past record of domestic instability and its occasional 
flirtation with the most radical Arab regimes a nuclear Pakistan could 
also become the source of fissile material nuclear technology and 
political support for extremist anti-Amencan countries American 
interests lie in a close relationship with a moderate Pakistan If 
despite American cautions such a Pakistan should decide to become a 
nuclear power there remain good strategic reasons to continue the 
relationship even if this requires the rewriting of restrictive U S non 
proliferation legislation
The U S and India An Uneasy Accommodation0
One of the enduring puzzles of American diplomacy in South Asia 
is that it has never been able to accommodate the region s dominant 
power India Indeed there is a paradox behind the puzzle some of 
the reasons cited in favor of such an accommodation are actually 
obstacles to U S -Indian cooperation Two examples will suffice First 
the fact that the U S and India are large pluralist democracies also 
means that it is easy for groups in both countries to poison the 
relationship Ignorance about India is widespread in the U S 
misinformation about the U S — compounded by an active Soviet 
disinformation program— is widespread in India Second the fact that 
India is the regional dominant power is seen in New Delhi as justifying 
an Indian version of the Monroe Doctrine m South Asia but because
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the U S has legitimate interests in other regional states (especially 
Pakistan) it cannot fully concede Indias claim This American 
reluctance to give India its way in South Asia when coupled with 
American statements of India s power and greatness contribute to the 
paranoid Indian view (a view encouraged openly by the Soviets) that 
the U S regards large powerful India as a threat!
Nevertheless the U S and India have been forced to take each 
other seriously The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the U S 
back into South Asia as Pakistan s main arms supplier Yet The U S 
cannot—even if it wanted to—supply Pakistan with the weapons that 
would ensure its security against the much larger and more powerful 
India let alone enable Pakistan to resist a combined Indo-Soviet 
onslaught
India on the other hand cannot view the supply of U S weapons 
to Pakistan with complacency Yet New Delhi must hesitate before it 
joins with Moscow to pressure Pakistan To do so risks direct 
American-Soviet conflict in South Asia even if successful such 
pressure might lead to the destruction of Pakistan This at best 
would result m the creation of a group of weak buffer states between 
India and the Soviet Union at worst India would share a long 
contested border with the Russians
The Indian leadership belatedly recognizes how costly its own 
Soviet tie has been (the two have a Treaty of Peace and Friendship) 
Not only did the Soviets fail to consult with New Delhi on the eve of 
their invasion of Afghanistan Moscow has begun to normalize its 
relationship with China undercutting the chief premise of Indo-Soviet 
strategic cooperation Yet because New Delhi is still dependent upon 
the Soviets for arms it has been unable to contemplate a truly 
independent policy settling instead for a half-hearted dialogue with 
the U S as a way of warning Moscow not to take it for granted
This strategy is unlikely to succeed in either Moscow or 
Washmgton New Delhi remains too aloof and too suspicious of U S 
intentions to accommodate important American regional and global 
interests (its gratuitous fawning over the Sandinista junta is only the 
most notorious of its attempts to prove its independence from the 
U S ) Moscow treats Indian leaders scholars and soldiers with 
astonishing hospitality but a closer look reveals that it has given up on 
New Delhi for serious strategic purposes India refuses to pressure 
Pakistan on Moscow s behalf it refuses to offer bases to or engage m 
joint military planning exercises or intelligence sharing with Moscow 
and its importance for the Soviets vis a vis China is declining as Sino- 
Soviet normalization proceeds
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The net result of these trends has been an increasingly isolated 
and frustrated India Such an India is more rather than less likely to 
harm important American interests There are recent signs of this
• In February in the midst of their largest ever military 
exercises Operation Brass Tacks the Indian military 
suddenly proclaimed a crisis with Pakistan and 
dramatically rushed massive reinforcements to the 
Pakistan border
• At the same moment army officials informed visitors of a 
Spring exercise ( Operation Checkerboard) on the eastern 
border facing China This has led to a major Indian 
buildup just south of Tibet (and a Chinese counter 
buildup) which could very well lead to hostilities in late 
Fall
• In early June m a highly publicized military operation the 
Indian Air force flew several relief missions over Sri 
Lanka accompanied by advanced LAF Mirage fighters
• India s nuclear debate seems to have reached the 
conclusion that a limited covert nuclear program is 
necessary to keep up with Pakistan s effort India s nuclear 
hawks have not yet carried the day but a weak and 
frustrated India is more likely to exercise the nuclear 
option than a strong and confident one
None of these trends are in America s interest India is the 
dominant country in a region that contains exactly a quarter of 
mankind and the largest group of people living under the rule of law 
Numbers alone do not necessarily add up to power but India s 
scientific and military establishments are among the best in the world 
certainly the equal of Chinas A militant expansionist India could 
wreck Amencan-Pakistan relations entangle the Chinese m irrelevant 
regional conflicts stimulate global nuclear proliferation and spawn 
new terrorist and irredentist movements throughout South Asia
Accommodating legitimate Indian interests while pursuing 
important American ones is today the most difficult task facing the 
United States in South Asia It is a task made especially frustrating by 
the Indian diplomatic style which has gratuitously alienated several 
generations of American politicians and diplomats (the Pakistanis 
with their long experience of dealing with Americans from the 
position of junior partner have no such problem) Of course while 
the Indian negotiating style is partly cultural in origin it is 
complicated by deep ambivalence as to the kind of state India should 
become—an accommodating generous regional power or one that 
commands and demands obedience from its smaller neighbors
10
Given Washington s preoccupation with Afghanistan for the past 
seven years— and thus a special focus on Pakistan— it is surprising that 
U S -Indian relations are still viable However the strategic dialogue 
begun in June 1985 (during Rajiv Gandhi s visit to Washington) is 
frozen This is partly because the Reagan administration was unable to 
provide certain dual-use high technology items to New Delhi but 
chiefly because of New Delhi s ambivalence over its opening to the 
U S Clearly the opening was seen by India as a way of reducing U S 
support for Pakistan This has failed to occur one is reminded of 
earlier optimistic Indian statements that the Soviets would soon quit 
Afghanistan In both cases New Delhi has chosen to blame Washington 
for its own strategic miscalculations
What steps can the U S take to repair its relationship with 
India—or at least to reduce the damages to important American 
interests9
First in these matters there is no substitute for sustained high 
level interest Indian leaders resent being equated with Pakistan by 
Washington and regard China as their natural counterpart If 
Washington were to devote half the attention and resources to India as 
they give to China that would probably be twice what is necessary— but 
still far more than India receives today Of course India has not 
generally behaved with the skill and maturity of a China— some would 
argue that it is getting all the attention it deserves Still this attention 
is primarily in the context of Americas Afghanistan and Pakistan 
strategies
On regional matters American policy has been correct and has 
not challenged Indian dominance The U S has refrained from the 
temptation to expand its ties to those regional states (such as Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh) that are in domestic difficulty In Sn Lanka 
the U S has consistently supported Indian peacemaking efforts even 
though it is clearly one of the parties to the dispute through its 
support of extremist Tamil revolutionary groups
The most senous point of disagreement between New Delhi and 
Washington is over U S relations with Pakistan New Delhi is both 
fearful and jealous of the attention Pakistan has received and vastly 
exaggerates the alleged U S -Pakistan strategic alliance Nothing will 
completely alleviate Indian suspicions and the best cure for them is 
direct India-Pakistani discussions on regional security issues (where 
the Indians will have to do some explaimng about their own ties to the 
Soviet Union which on paper are more binding than those between 
Pakistan and the U S ) The point to be made to thoughtful Indians is 
that a limited U S security tie to Pakistan is in India s own interest 
since a weak and unstable Pakistan would only draw the Soviet Union 
further into the Subcontinent
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As for nuclear issues there may be more of a chance of 
restraining India s program- or at least suspending it-  than Pakistan s 
Any progress m capping the Pakistani nuclear program will strengthen 
the hands of the significant anti nuclear lobby in India There is no 
chance that India will shut down its nuclear research program and 
there is little chance that it will sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty but 
movement in Islamabad could be parlayed into a fixed-period regional 
nuclear freeze in South Asia (accompanied by limited verification or 
inspection arrangements to ensure that neither side was cheating) 
This in turn could lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive 
regional non-nuclear arrangement Even if such an arrangement fell 
short of full NPT safeguards it would be a triumph for American and 
regional diplomacy
Finally in India more than Pakistan America faces a real 
problem in getting its message across Over the past twenty years U S 
cultural and information programs have been gutted and those that 
remain are often ineptly run India is deluged with skilful Soviet 
propaganda and the Indian state information services are often pro 
Soviet balancing this thousands of Indians turn to the United States 
for higher education and very few leading families do not have one or 
more relatives resident in America A well-funded sophisticated 
cultural and information program would build on this base and on the 
essential compatibility of American and Indian political economic and 
ideological interests It would also try to reach out to the vernacular 
elites who will increasingly dominate a country whose population is 
projected to exceed that of Chinas in twenty years
Policy and Process for the Next Decade
American policy in South Asia had a relatively easy task over the 
past seven years It required neither massive resources nor strategic 
innovation nor much skill to respond effectively to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan That response has helped stabilize Pakistan it is 
beginning to turn the tide m Afghanistan itself and it has not yet 
damaged U S relations with Pakistan s chief threat and the region s 
most powerful state India As long as the Soviets remain in 
Afghanistan the U S should continue to provide credible assurances to 
Pakistan that it will be protected from Soviet threats and pressure
But these assurances need not spill over into a commitment 
against India Pakistan s security ultimately rests on forging a stable 
strategic relationship with New Delhi That relationship must rest 
upon a balanced imbalance a Pakistani capability to make unacceptably 
costly an Indian attack coupled with a Pakistani inability to initiate and 
prevail m a conflict with India The present Indo-Pakistani military 
relationship meets these entena although stability could be enhanced 
by explicit confidence-building and arms control measure between the 
two countries
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Given such a balanced imbalance and further reduction m the 
ideological and political tensions between the two countries India and 
Pakistan could restore something of the strategic integrity the 
Subcontinent had under the British Raj These are long term 
considerations but not idealistic ones a new generation of strategic 
thinkers m both countries have come to regard the Indo Pakistani 
dispute as an anachronism 6 It is very much in America s interest to 
encourage such regional thinking together India and Pakistan have 
the resources to defend the Subcontinent and even play a constructive 
role in nearby regions our major policy failures m the area have come 
about when we either chose sides in the Indo-Pakistan dispute or 
dropped out of the region altogether The original impetus of U S 
policy makers at the dawn of the containment era was correct support 
for Indo-Pakistan normalization is an often frustrating but necessary 
prerequisite for the broader goal of an independent South Asia
One way the U S can enrich the regional security dialogue is by 
clarifying with Pakistan and India the criteria for U S military 
assistance to each This is really is a multilateral issue smce U S arms 
supplied to Pakistan directly affect Indian security and many of the 
advanced dual-use technologies that have been provided to India will 
find their way to the border with Pakistan (and indeed to India s 
border with China) The U S has often failed to take the regional 
balance of power into account needlessly raising suspicions among 
Pakistanis that the U S is only waiting until the end of the Afghan war 
to tilt to India and in India that the U S has entered into a tight 
long-term security relationship with Pakistan Neither is the case 
neither would enhance complex U S regional interests
Such an initiative would necessarily involve China The U S is 
the only major state with good ties to India Pakistan and China a 
regional understanding between these three is in America s interest 
and not beyond reach American apathy— or a single-minded focus on 
the Afghanistan issue— only provides another opening to an 
increasingly flexible and imaginative Soviet diplomacy It is not in 
Washington s interest to again allow the Soviets to serve as the 
regional peacekeeper cum balancer
The United States could also more actively promote a nuclear 
agreement that will survive the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan Although such an agreement must rest on Indian and 
Pakistani self-interest it is not necessarily in their interest to become 
nuclear powers Both have legitimate regional and global ambitions 
and neither will permanently give up the nuclear option Yet a 
military nuclear program would be costly for each country and would
6 For a sample of the range of Indian and Pakistani strategic thinking see Stephen 
Philip Cohen ed The Security of South Asia American and Aslan Perspectives (Chicago and 
Urbana University of Illinois Press 1987)
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expose them to certain risks and uncertainties as they became 
fledgling nuclear powers While I tend to agree with Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear advocates that regional nuclearization would stabilize 
the Subcontinent (a la Kenneth Waltz and Andre Beaufre) and m these 
terms might be welcomed it would be globally destabilizing and 
harmful to the interests of the U S and many other nuclear and non 
nuclear countries As we have suggested the appropriate strategy to 
contain regional nuclear programs in South Asia is not threat and 
bluster but the development of an array of positive incentives 
Certainly the U S will have to approach the PRC and perhaps the 
Soviet Union in assembling such a package of incentives one of which 
should be the declaration of South Asia as a nuclear free zone in 
exchange for regional nuclear abstinence
Finally the U S is inadequately organized to deal with an 
emerging South Asia In almost every U S foreign policy bureaucracy 
South Asian issues receive less than their due share of high level 
attention In some places even Afghanistan is not accorded the 
bureaucratic clout it deserves South Asia is too volatile too complex 
and ultimately too important for a wide range of American interests to 
allow the present arrangements to continue A thoroughgoing 
adjustment in responsibilities and the creation of an Assistant 
Secretary-level position for South and Southwest Asia m State will 
meet half of the organizational problem The other half will take 
longer and requires the rebuilding of enfeebled regional expertise in 
the Foreign Service the U S Information Service and the intelligence 
community Without this expertise and without sustained high level 
attention the U S will have to settle for a less than a marginal role in 
shaping the future of a quarter of mankind
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